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CARL H. FULDA**
The Administrative Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation has prepared a bill to amend the Ohio Administrative Pro-
cedure Act' "for the purpose of creating an Administrative Review
Commission." This novel and imaginative proposal for the reform
of administrative law deserves wide publicity and approval in prin-
ciple prior to its introduction in the next legislature.
Under present law, any party affected by an order of an agency
adopting, amending or rescinding a rule may appeal to the Court of
Common Pleas of Franklin County.2 An appeal from an adjudication
order denying admission to an examination, denying issuance or re-
newal of a license or suspending a license may be filed with the court
of common pleas of the county in which the place of business or the
residence of the licensee is located.3 In adjudication cases, that court
shall review the record prepared and certified by the agency and may
affirm the agency's order if it finds, "upon consideration of the entire
record, and such additional evidence as the court has admitted,4 that
the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence,
and is in accordance with law."5
The proposed legislation would substitute for the court of com-
mon pleas an "administrative review commission," consisting of ten
members, one from each of the ten judicial court of appeals districts.
The Governor would appoint the members, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, for ten year terms. The members of the Commission
must be members of the Bar in good standing and have practiced
law for at least five years prior to their appointment. The rules of
evidence in civil actions tried without a jury would be applied in all
hearings before the Commission. Appeals from the decisions of the
Commission would go to the Courts of Appeals.
* This is a revised version of an address delivered at the annual meeting of the
Administrative Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association in Dayton, on May
19, 1961.
** Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.
I Ohio Rev. Code -Ch. 119.
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 119.11.
3 Ohio Rev. Code § 119.12. Appeals from orders of the Board of Liquor Control
may go to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.
4 Such admission is prescribed for newly discovered evidence which could not
with reasonable diligence have been obtained prior to the agency hearing.
5 Ohio Rev. Code § 119.12. For the standards of reviewing rules see Ohio Rev.
Code § 119.11.
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The "administrative review commission" would, obviously, be a
judicial body with jurisdiction to review the orders of administrative
agencies.6 On the state level, this would apparently be a pioneer
venture without precedent. 7 On the other hand, recommendations
for establishment of federal administrative courts of original juris-
diction have been much debated in recent years." The opponents of
these recommendations emphasized that a complete separation of
judicial from rule-making or executive functions is neither feasible
nor desirable.' For instance, the power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to determine what rates are just and reasonable should
not be split off from the power to award to shippers reparation when
unjust rates have been exacted from them. The exercise of both of
these powers is based on the same considerations of fact' ° and requires
the same knowledge of intricate economic data. Hence, initial deter-
minations by the members of the agency are required if the task
entrusted to the agency is to be expertly performed.
These very sound objections are, generally, not applicable to the
proposed "administrative review commission," which is primarily
designed as an appellate or reviewing body. Hence, the danger of
paralyzing the agencies' programs, which is the principal argument
against administrative courts of original jurisdiction, does not exist.
The "administrative review commission" would simply take the place
now occupied by the courts of common pleas in reviewing the validity
of administrative orders. Its job would be comparable to that of the
Board of Review in the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation"
6 The term "agency" is defined in Ohio Rev. Code § 119.01 as including state
agencies. Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code, added in 1957, provides for appeals
to the court of common pleas from decisions of political subdivisions of the state.
7 For a summary of legislative developments in state administrative law see
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Vol. 1, at 33 (1958).
8 For a brilliant analysis and critique of these proposals see R. W. Minor, "The
Administrative Court; Variations on a Theme," 19 Ohio St. L. J. 380 (1958). Davis,
op. cit. supra, note 7, at 31.
D Minor: op. cit. supra, note 8, at 395.
10 Minor, id., at 396.
11 The Committee's bill would grant to the administrative review commission
exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings to suspend or revoke a license, presumably
on the ground that these involve discipline for misconduct which should not be
imposed by an administrative body. The answer is that the expert administrators should
have the first, but not the last, word as to whether the conduct of the licensee con-
stitutes such a serious threat to the public interest as to require such discipline. I would,
therefore, suggest deletion of this provision.
12 Ohio Rev. Code § 4141.06. See Fisher, "Claims Administration in the Ohio
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review," 12 Ohio St. LJ. 69 (1951). The
Board of Tax Appeals also has appellate jurisdiction [Ohio Rev. Code § 5703.02(E)],
but this is not its sole function.
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which differs from the "administrative review commission" only in
that the Board's jurisdiction is narrower and its members are not pro-
tected by as long a tenure as is proposed for the "administrative re-
view commission."
The purpose of creating that commission is fairly obvious: The
issues arising in cases involving the validity of administrative adjudi-
cations or rules are "not within the conventional experience of
judges,"'13 in this instance common pleas judges, and, therefore, would
be better handled by a tribunal of experts. In other words, "expert"
administrators should be supervised by "expert" judges who have
acquired-preferably prior to their appointment-specialized knowl-
edge of and experience in the problems of administration and are,
therefore, thought to be better qualified than overburdened common
pleas judges to provide the fair adjustment between the rights of the
individual and the interest of the state which we call justice. Moreover,
centralization of such case in one tribunal would promote uniformity
of decisions, which would be further enhanced by allowing direct
appeals from the commission to the Supreme Court.14
The idea of a judicial body which reviews exclusively the val-
idity of administrative action has heretofore been accepted in the
United States only in a few particular fields of law.'5 The proposed
court with appellate jurisdiction covering all administrative state
agencies would be an innovation which may disturb traditional notions
that specialization is not desirable because it may lead to narrow
rather than broad perspectives. However, such an attitude would
ignore the expansion of public law in this century; indeed, an "admin-
istrative court" reviewing all orders and rules issued by all admin-
istrative agencies could hardly be called over-specialized.
The merits of the present proposal for Ohio cannot be fully
appreciated without reference to European experience where "admin-
istrative courts" have existed for more than a century. In fact, France,
West Germany, and many other countries' 6 have two separate sets
18 Far East Conference, et al. v. United States, et al., 342 U.S. 570, at 574 (1952).
Mr. justice Frankfurter's frequently quoted phrase referred to the intent of Congress
in establishing the Federal Maritime Board.
'4 Such appeal is presently allowed from final orders of the Public Utilities
Commission, Ohio Rev. Code § 4903.13. The bill in its present form provides for appeals
to the Court of Appeals.
15 The Tax Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are federal
examples. See Frankfurter, "The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States---
A Study in the Federal Judicial System: IV. Federal Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction,"
39 Harv. L.R. 587 (1926).
16 Belgium, Italy, Turkey, and Greece.
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of courts: the regular law courts which deal with private and penal
law, and the administrative courts which provide the forum in which
the citizen may challenge the legality of administrative action alleged
to violate his individual rights. Since France was the first and prob-
ably the most successful country in adopting and implementing such
a system,17 a brief summary of the reasons for its creation and of a
few illustrative cases may be in order.
The theory of administrative jurisdiction rests, to a considerable
extent, on the proposition that the judges of the law courts do not
possess the necessary competence in administrative problems; there-
fore, the legality of administrative action should be determined by
judges who have such competence. Indeed, the leading British com-
mentator concluded:
No Administrator can in France rationally adopt the attitude
. . . that the [administrative] judge has reached a decision with-
out appreciating the context in which the decision has to operate:
he cannot claim, . . . that he, the civil servant, knows, and thejudge does not know, the necessities of administration. This ad-
ministrative judge has a higher technical competence than any of
the administrators whose act he is judging .... 18
The recruitment of the administrative judges is, thus, of crucial
importance. 9 In France, the national administrative court, which
reviews the acts of the national government and hears appeals from
local administrative tribunals on matters involving local officials, is
a part of a larger organization known as the Council of State. The
Council is divided into one judicial section and four administrative
sections. The latter act as advisers to the Executive, preparing opin-
ions on legal questions and drafting bills and regulations. The func-
17 See Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common-Law World (New
York, 1954); Von Mehren, The Civil Law System 250-336 (1957); Hamson, Executive
Discretion and judicial Control (London, 1954); Letourneur, "Control of Govern-
mental Action to Prevent the Violation of Individual Rights," 21 Ohio St. L.. 559
(1960).
1s Hamson, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 66. Schwartz, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 321,
observes that the French administrative judges "need assume none of the leave-it-to-
the-expert attitude that has too often dominated the work of Anglo-American courts in
this field."
19 In Germany, it is considered elementary that only persons with at least several
years experience in the executive branch of the state or federal governments will be
appointed as administrative judges. Koehler, Verwaltungsgerichtsordunng (1960), p. S.
(A commentary on the statute establishing the administrative courts and regulating
their practice and procedure.) Many of the French administrative judges held high
executive posts before their appointment or came up through the ranks after passing
competitive examinations. Schwartz, op. cit. supra, note 17, pp. 30, 31; Hamson, op. cit.
supra, pp. 46-43.
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tions of the judicial section are separate and independent from those
of the administrative sections. Members of the latter may be trans-
ferred to the former, but, thereafter, may not participate in the ad-
judication of a controversy involving a matter with which the member
was officially concerned while serving in the administrative section.
The judicial section, whose members are protected by life tenure,
has frequently annulled a regulation proposed by one of the adminis-
trative sections.2
A few cases picked at random, but dealing with generally signifi-
cant issues, may illustrate the work of the judicial section of the
Council which proceeds entirely on a common-law type case-by-case
basis:
The fundamentals of what we call procedural due process are
jealously guarded. For instance, in one case refusal to renew a license
to operate a news stand was set aside. The Council held that the grant
of the privilege to use the public street was revocable at will, but since
the police had charged the operator with misconduct, the latter was
entitled to an opportunity to defend himself."
Not only the reasonableness of executive acts, but also the
motivation of officials are subject to judicial scrutiny. Thus, the
Council set aside an order by a mayor limiting the number of taxi
stands on the ground that the order "was made.., not in the interest
of traffic regulation but to satisfy the demands of the taxi-drivers'
association."2 Administrators must at all times be ready to justify
their conduct. In a case which attracted wide attention a Cabinet
member had removed the name of an applicant from the list of candi-
dates for the competitive examinations required for admission to the
National Academy of Public Administration. The excluded candidate
obtained a judgment setting aside the exclusion. The Cabinet member
had refused to permit judicial inspection of petitioner's file, and this
was held to corroborate the charge of arbitrariness.23
The standards of judicial review are strict with respect to both
law and fact. For instance, a local government had imposed a special
emergency property tax on half-occupied buildings in accordance with
a statute authorizing such a step in municipalities suffering from a
severe housing shortage. The court found there was no such shortage
and, therefore, annulled the tax. 4
20 For detailed discussion of the organization of the Council of State see Schwartz,
op. cit. supra, pp. 23-42 and Hamson, op. cit. supra, pp. 58-69, 74-76, 78-83.
21 Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier, Von Mehren, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 280.
22 Trapy, Von Mehren, op. cit. supra, p. 318.
23 Barel, Von Mehren, p. 319, Hamson, pp. 24-40, 201-204.
24 Commune de Veules-Les-Roses (1948), Von Mehren, p. 329. The decision is
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These all-too-brief examples indicate that the protection of the
citizen's rights against abuse or excess of administrative power is the
aim of the administrative court. In fact, the French seem to go
further than we do in at least two important respects: First, the case
of the emergency tax indicates that the Council of State will inquire
into facts when the statute makes the existence of certain facts the
condition for the challenged act. In Ohio, judicial review under the
present Administrative Procedure Act "falls short of providing for a
trial de novo, ' 25 and with respect to appeals from local bodies the court
may inquire into the facts only if a statute explicitly so provides. 6
Second, the case involving the regulation which limited the
number of taxi stands, and other similar cases,27 indicates that the
French go further than our courts by permitting inquiry into the
motivation of administrative action. To be sure, an obvious abuse of
power, as occurred in a recent Ohio case where a civil service employee
was told his job had been abolished and immediately thereafter another
man was hired to perform the same service,28 will not slip by. But
where the regulation or adjudication appears reasonable on its face,
as in the taxi-stand matter, motives will usually not be considered. 29
All this demonstrates the achievements of a tribunal which serves
the same purposes as the proposed "administrative review commis-
sion." ° The present eminence of the French Council of State, and
other similar systems, is the result of a long tradition which we could
comparable to Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) which affirmed a judgment granting
a trial de novo on the question whether the beneficiary of an award under the Long-
shoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act was an employee within the
purview of that act. Contra, South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251
(1940).
25 Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, at 280 131 N.E.2d 390
(1955).
26 See Sorge v. Sutton, 159 Ohio St. 574 113 N.E.2d 10 (1953), holding that Ohio
Rev. Code 143.27 authorizing appeals to the court of common pleas from decisions of
a municipal civil service commission removing police officers or firemen did not
authorize a trial de novo. The section was subsequently amended by providing for an
appeal "on questions of law and fact." The proposed bill should be amended by giving
to the "administrative review commission" jurisdiction to hear appeals from municipal
bodies. No valid constitutional objections could be perceived, since this should be a
matter of general law. See Ohio Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sections 3 and 7. The amend-
ment of Ohio Rev. Code 143.27 has not been challenged.
27 Von Mehren, op. cit. supra, pp. 316-320.
28 State ex rel. Click v. Thormyer, 105 0. App. 479 151 N.E.2d 246 (1958).
29 See Davis: Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 12.03 and 12.04 (1958) and Ad-
ministrative Law (Hornbook, 1951) p. 379.
30 An important difference would and should remain: The proposed bill allows an
appeal back into the regular appellate courts, while the Europeans maintain the
separateness of civil and administrative jurisdictions at all stages.
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not match in a hurry. But the basic philosophy of the institution seems
sound and deserves the most serious consideration. As noted earlier,
the recruitment of qualified persons3' to serve on the proposed body
would be an indispensable prerequisite for its success. This should
not present an insuperable obstacle to adoption of the Committee's
proposal which is a stimulating contribution to the endless effort of
improvement.
31 Ten members would be too many. Three would be sufficient. The ten year
tenure would be discriminatory against other judges, but that would be an argument
for lengthening tenure generally. The proposal reflects apprehension that anything
short of ten years would not guaranty protection against political pressure, which, in
view of the commission's jurisdiction, could be expected.
